Interesting Shyamal!
I will be there.
Thanks for posting this.
-Sowmyan
> Ph.D. Thesis Defense
> >
> >
> > Speaker : Mr. Swaprava Nath
> > Title : Mechanism Design for Strategic Crowdsourcing
> > Faculty Advisor : Prof. Y. Narahari
> >
> > Date : Tuesday, December 17, 2013
> > Time : 11:30 AM
> > Venue : CSA Multimedia Class (Room No. 252, First Floor)
>
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore
>
> > Abstract
> >
> > This thesis looks into the economics of crowdsourcing using
> > game theoretic modeling. The art of aggregating information and expertise
> > from a diverse population has been in practice since a long time.
> >
> > The Internet and the revolution in communication and computational
> > technologies has made this task easier and given birth to a new era of
> > online resource aggregation, which is now popularly referred to as
> > crowdsourcing. Two important
> > features of crowdsourcing are: (a) crowdsourcing
> > is always human driven, hence the participants are rational and
> intelligent
> > and they experience a payoff in some form through their participation,
> and
> > (b) the participants are connected over a social network. To understand
> >
> > the behavior and the outcome of such a strategic crowd, we need to
> > understand the economics of a crowdsourcing network. In the thesis,
> > we have considered the following three major facets of the crowdsourcing
> > problem.
> >
> > (i) Elicitation of the true qualities of the crowd workers:
> > as the crowd is often unstructured and unknown to the designer, it is
> > important to determine if the crowdsourced job is indeed performed at the
> > highest quality.
> >
> > (ii) Resource critical task execution: due to the diverse geographical,
> > cultural, socio-economic reasons, crowdsourcing entails certain
> > manipulations that are unusual in the classical theory. The design
> > has to
> > be robust enough to handle fake identities or information provided
> > by the crowd.
> >
> > (iii) Improving the productivity of the crowdsourcing network: as the
> > designer's goal is to maximize some measurable output of the
> crowdsourcing
> >
> > system, an interesting question is how one can design the network and/or
> > the incentive scheme so that the system performs at the optimal level
> > considering the strategic nature of the individuals.
> >
> > In the thesis, we provide novel solutions to all the questions above
> >
> > using game theoretic modeling and mechanism design innovations. Our
> > investigation helps in understanding certain limits of achievability,
> > and provides design protocols in order to make crowdsourcing more
> > efficient.
> >
> >
> > ALL ARE WELCOME
> >
> >
>