Thomas Dalton writes:
I have a right to your house. Oh, sure, it's not recognized by anyone, but I promise I have it!
Like I say, there's a world outside the legal profession. Just because something isn't recognised by the law doesn't mean it isn't recognised by anyone.
So you recognize my right to your house? Cool! Where is it? When can I get the keys?
Where do you think laws come from? Do you think they appear from nowhere? They are created by politicians (and sometimes judges) based on moral values. Those moral values imply certain moral rights whether they are written down in statute (or case law) or not.
Oh, so you're creating a special Thomas Daltonian definition of the word "moral rights." Cool!
Do you understand what the term "term of art" means?
Honestly? No, I'd have to look it up. However, I don't need to know fancy lawyer speak to understand the concept of morality.
So you're under the impression that "term of art" is "fancy lawyer speak"?
By the way, most members of the legal profession are not students of the philosophy of law. It is your misfortune that, in me, you have come across someone who is. I'm not disqualified from pointing out philosophical mistakes merely because I can hang out a shingle.
Well, maybe when you progress a little further in your studies you'll actually know something about the subject. I'm a mathematician, I am well trained in logic and reasoned argument.
This underscores your problem, perhaps. Many mathematicians are under the impression that reasoning from first principles is a substitute for actually doing the necessary reading and learning. The notion that one can argue without knowledge of the relevant facts is one that is common, all by no means universal, among my friends who are mathematicians.
While I may not be an expert on the relevant facts, I can follow an argument and see if it makes sense, and yours rarely do.
I can understand why arguments based on reading you have not done and facts you do not have wouldn't make sense to you. I'll make allowances.
--Mike
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