Anthony writes:
Maybe you could explain the etymology of that term for
us, Mike.
Your last
paragraph seems to imply that you understand it.
Thanks. But surely you don't expect me to tutor you on "moral rights"
jurisprudence when the materials you need are widely available
elsewhere.
In any case, how do you propose that we can continue
in a way that
doesn't
confuse you with sentences like "moral rights are a type of moral
rights"?
I don't feel confused -- it seems to me quite clear where you've gone
wrong.
There is a fundamental difference between a right
granted by law and a pre-existing right recognised by law.
Is this difference based on anything in the physical world?
Sure, it's based on whether or not the jurisdiction recognizes the
right.
Oh, you're using "fundamental" in a way I wasn't expecting. I thought
you meant to be understood as saying that the "pre-existing right" had
an independent existence, outside of jurisprudence.
It's true
that religious beliefs don't have great force in Western
courtrooms. I dismiss this particular religious belief not because
it's irrelevant in a courtroom, however, but because there is no
evidence in the physical world that this difference exists.
In what way is the concept of moral rights a religious belief?
It's invisible, unanalyzable, and an article of faith among believers.
Thomas, you
may believe that the longstanding debate between
natural law and positivists has been resolved in favor of the
former, but
there's no sign that this is true with regard to copyright.
You could have saved us a lot of time by saying that instead of
pretending
you didn't know what I was talking about.
I actually didn't know what you were talking about, since you use
language so imprecisely.
If what
you were saying were widely accepted, it would be odd that "moral
rights" obtain as to copyright/creative expression but not as to
things like property ownership and personal liberty.
That would be odd if it were true. But it isn't. Theft and slavery
are
morally wrong, in addition to (and regardless of) being illegal.
I happen to agree that they are morally wrong, but not as a function
of natural-rights jurisprudence. I don't, however, believe abridgement
of rights in copyright is morally wrong (although of course I don't
approve of it). There's a distinction between malum prohibitum and
malum in se.
I have a right
to your house. Oh, sure, it's not recognized by
anyone, but I promise I have it!
Why would you call it *my* house, then?
Convention.
In any case, moral rights are recognized by many
people, just not
indisputably under Florida law.
Florida law? I thought we were talking about copyright.
I see, so you *were* being intentionally obtuse. To
try to teach me
a lesson. I have to admit I'm glad that's what it was. To have to
conclude
that you were a complete dolt would have been much more shocking
than the
conclusion that you're a troll.
And I did learn a lesson. I learned about your ignorance of right and
wrong, and got a glimpse of the nihilism it stems from.
You seem confused here. Sometimes you want to attribute ignorance to
me, and sometimes you think I'm intentionally pretending to be
ignorant in order to teach you a lesson. I don't think you can
consistently hold both views with regard to the same subject matter.
Next time you should reflect a little and review your posting before
you hit the Send button.
--Mike