George William Herbert wrote:

... It would also not be much more effort or customer impact to pad to the next larger 1k size for a random large fraction of transmissions.

Padding each transmission with a random number of bytes, up to say 50 or 100, might provide a greater defense against fingerprinting while saving massive amounts of bandwidth.

... At some point the ops team would need a security team, an IDS team, and a counterintelligence team to watch the other teams, and I don't know if the Foundation cares that much or would find operating that way to be a more comfortable moral and practical stance...

I'm absolutely sure that they do care enough to get it right, but I think that approach might be overkill. Just one or two cryptology experts to make the transition to HTTPS, PFS, and whatever padding is prudent would really help. I also hope that, if there is an effort to spread disinformation about the value of such techniques, that the Foundation might consider joining with e.g. the EFF to help fight it. I think it's likely that a single cryptology consultant would probably be able to make great progress in both. Getting cryptography right isn't so much as a time-intensive task as it is sensitive to experience and training.

Setting up and monitoring with ongoing auditing can often be automated, but does require the continued attention of at least one highly skilled expert, and preferably more than one in case the first one gets hit by a bus.