How much would it cost to replace the servers and switches with open source hardware?
Stephen, when do you expect to have the FEC requirements of organized advocates for US political candidates researched?
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Stephen LaPorte slaporte@wikimedia.org Date: Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 2:23 AM Subject: [Publicpolicy] Update on FISA 702 reauthorization To: Publicpolicy Group for Wikimedia Publicpolicy@lists.wikimedia.org
Hello All,
Earlier this month, the Wikimedia Foundation, along with a coalition of 43 civil liberties, civil rights, and transparency organizations, signed a letter urging Congress to reform Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the law that allegedly authorizes the mass surveillance challenged in our lawsuit, Wikimedia Foundation v. National Security Agency. In the letter, we urged Congress to oppose a straightforward reauthorization of the law and to support meaningful reforms.
On January 11th, the U.S. House of Representatives quashed the opportunity for those reforms by voting to reauthorize Section 702 with minimal changes. The bill then went to the U.S. Senate for further consideration. Despite opposition in the Senate from both major political parties, on January 16th, a filibuster to block the bill narrowly failed. Yesterday, the bill cleared the Senate, and it was signed into law today.
Although we are deeply disappointed in this result, the Wikimedia Foundation will continue to fight for user privacy, including in Wikimedia Foundation v. NSA. We will keep you updated on further developments.
Best, Stephen
-- Stephen LaPorte Legal Director Wikimedia Foundation
NOTICE: As an attorney for the Wikimedia Foundation, for legal and ethical reasons, I cannot give legal advice to, or serve as a lawyer for, community members, volunteers, or staff members in their personal capacity. For more on what this means, please see our legal disclaimer.
_______________________________________________ Publicpolicy mailing list Publicpolicy@lists.wikimedia.org https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/publicpolicy
Hi Jim,
I'm afraid I don't quite follow. 1) I don't quite see how your question about servers and switches relates to Stephen's statement. Could you explain for us mere mortals how you link the two? 2) I somehow missed the commitment by the WMF to research "FEC requirements of organized advocates for US political candidates' or anything that suggests that the WMF may advocate for specific political candidates (which seems a change of course that would be hard to sweep under the rug). Could you quote?
Thanks.
Lodewijk
On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 4:01 AM, James Salsman jsalsman@gmail.com wrote:
How much would it cost to replace the servers and switches with open source hardware?
Stephen, when do you expect to have the FEC requirements of organized advocates for US political candidates researched?
---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Stephen LaPorte slaporte@wikimedia.org Date: Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 2:23 AM Subject: [Publicpolicy] Update on FISA 702 reauthorization To: Publicpolicy Group for Wikimedia Publicpolicy@lists.wikimedia.org
Hello All,
Earlier this month, the Wikimedia Foundation, along with a coalition of 43 civil liberties, civil rights, and transparency organizations, signed a letter urging Congress to reform Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the law that allegedly authorizes the mass surveillance challenged in our lawsuit, Wikimedia Foundation v. National Security Agency. In the letter, we urged Congress to oppose a straightforward reauthorization of the law and to support meaningful reforms.
On January 11th, the U.S. House of Representatives quashed the opportunity for those reforms by voting to reauthorize Section 702 with minimal changes. The bill then went to the U.S. Senate for further consideration. Despite opposition in the Senate from both major political parties, on January 16th, a filibuster to block the bill narrowly failed. Yesterday, the bill cleared the Senate, and it was signed into law today.
Although we are deeply disappointed in this result, the Wikimedia Foundation will continue to fight for user privacy, including in Wikimedia Foundation v. NSA. We will keep you updated on further developments.
Best, Stephen
-- Stephen LaPorte Legal Director Wikimedia Foundation
NOTICE: As an attorney for the Wikimedia Foundation, for legal and ethical reasons, I cannot give legal advice to, or serve as a lawyer for, community members, volunteers, or staff members in their personal capacity. For more on what this means, please see our legal disclaimer.
Publicpolicy mailing list Publicpolicy@lists.wikimedia.org https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/publicpolicy
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- I don't quite see how your question about servers and switches relates
to Stephen's statement. Could you explain for us mere mortals how you link the two?
The NSA surveillance which was reauthorized by Congress can not depend on eavesdropping alone with new HTTPS cyphers. It needs compromised hardware to work, such as has been included in Dell servers since the Foundation started purchasing them, and the design of which was overseen by the Foundation's CTO, who worked then at Intel. This provides us with the know-how, a teachable moment, and an excellent opportunity to specify and acquire replacement open source hardware which doesn't have the DIETYBOUNCE / System Management Mode OOB / iAMT and related backdoors.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/01/nsa_exploit_of.html
- I somehow missed the commitment by the WMF to research "FEC requirements
of organized advocates for US political candidates' or anything that suggests that the WMF may advocate for specific political candidates (which seems a change of course that would be hard to sweep under the rug). Could you quote?
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia_talk:Conflict_of_intere...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Slaporte_(WMF)#Research_topic_reques...
On 20 January 2018 at 22:43, James Salsman jsalsman@gmail.com wrote:
The NSA surveillance which was reauthorized by Congress can not depend on eavesdropping alone with new HTTPS cyphers. It needs compromised hardware to work,
Meltdown suggests otherwise. In any case EternalBlue and Stuxnet made it clear that the hardware is irrelevant.
The reality is that the WMF doesn't have the resources to prevent a state level actor from gaining access to its servers. Switching to little used, little supported and more expensive hardware simply weakens the WMF position even further since attackers no longer have to factor in the risk of burning a valuable exploit. So not much changed since 2013.
the WMF doesn't have the resources to prevent a state level actor from gaining access to its servers.
Do you think merely avoiding the most mass-produced and arguably widest backdoor is a step in the right direction?
Switching to little used, little supported and more expensive hardware simply weakens the WMF position even further since attackers no longer have to factor in the risk of burning a valuable exploit.
That they need not risk losing their prized exploit capabilities because they can't use them against open source hardware makes us safer or less safe than if they could use them but we spent less money?
What about moving to another country? Still not an option?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Jimbo_Wales/Archive_225#Wikimedia_ca...
the FTC and the FEC are very different organizations?
They both impose speech and behavior restrictions on paid advocates trying to push their products, services, or candidates. Those restrictions govern what is legal in the US on Wikipedia pertaining to COI issues.
Best regards, Jim
On 21 January 2018 at 12:56, James Salsman jsalsman@gmail.com wrote:
Do you think merely avoiding the most mass-produced and arguably widest backdoor is a step in the right direction?
Security though obscurity against state level actors? That is not going to work. And yes I know you seem to think that exploits are deliberate back-doors but that position requires an alarming degree of faith in the competence of the average programmer.
That they need not risk losing their prized exploit capabilities because they can't use them against open source hardware makes us safer or less safe than if they could use them but we spent less money?
Open source hardware is going to have exploits. From the POV of a state level actor burning those exploits is cheap since pretty much no one uses open source hardware. Thus the risk associated with compromising someone using open source hardware is pretty low. For someone using something more mainstream the risk is rather higher.
1) still don't see the relevance. If better technology is needed, it's needed - that should be independent of any lobbying preferences. It looks like you're just pushing tangents again.
2) You do realize that the FTC and the FEC are very different organizations? But again, it seems you just used this statement as an opportunity to push a tangent.
Please don't do that.
Thanks, Lodewijk
On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 2:43 PM, James Salsman jsalsman@gmail.com wrote:
- I don't quite see how your question about servers and switches relates
to Stephen's statement. Could you explain for us mere mortals how you
link
the two?
The NSA surveillance which was reauthorized by Congress can not depend on eavesdropping alone with new HTTPS cyphers. It needs compromised hardware to work, such as has been included in Dell servers since the Foundation started purchasing them, and the design of which was overseen by the Foundation's CTO, who worked then at Intel. This provides us with the know-how, a teachable moment, and an excellent opportunity to specify and acquire replacement open source hardware which doesn't have the DIETYBOUNCE / System Management Mode OOB / iAMT and related backdoors.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/01/nsa_exploit_of.html
- I somehow missed the commitment by the WMF to research "FEC
requirements
of organized advocates for US political candidates' or anything that suggests that the WMF may advocate for specific political candidates
(which
seems a change of course that would be hard to sweep under the rug).
Could
you quote?
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia_ talk:Conflict_of_interest&diff=prev&oldid=815460492# Note_from_Wikimedia_Legal
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Slaporte_(WMF)# Research_topic_request
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What about moving to another country? Still not an option?
Cheers Yaroslav
On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Lodewijk lodewijk@effeietsanders.org wrote:
- still don't see the relevance. If better technology is needed, it's
needed - that should be independent of any lobbying preferences. It looks like you're just pushing tangents again.
- You do realize that the FTC and the FEC are very different
organizations? But again, it seems you just used this statement as an opportunity to push a tangent.
Please don't do that.
Thanks, Lodewijk
On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 2:43 PM, James Salsman jsalsman@gmail.com wrote:
- I don't quite see how your question about servers and switches
relates
to Stephen's statement. Could you explain for us mere mortals how you
link
the two?
The NSA surveillance which was reauthorized by Congress can not depend on eavesdropping alone with new HTTPS cyphers. It needs compromised hardware to work, such as has been included in Dell servers since the Foundation started purchasing them, and the design of which was overseen by the Foundation's CTO, who worked then at Intel. This provides us with the know-how, a teachable moment, and an excellent opportunity to specify and acquire replacement open source hardware which doesn't have the DIETYBOUNCE / System Management Mode OOB / iAMT and related backdoors.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/01/nsa_exploit_of.html
- I somehow missed the commitment by the WMF to research "FEC
requirements
of organized advocates for US political candidates' or anything that suggests that the WMF may advocate for specific political candidates
(which
seems a change of course that would be hard to sweep under the rug).
Could
you quote?
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia_ talk:Conflict_of_interest&diff=prev&oldid=815460492# Note_from_Wikimedia_Legal
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Slaporte_(WMF)# Research_topic_request
Wikimedia-l mailing list, guidelines at: https://meta.wikimedia.org/ wiki/Mailing_lists/Guidelines and https://meta.wikimedia.org/ wiki/Wikimedia-l New messages to: Wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, mailto:wikimedia-l-request@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe
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I think, as Geni says, that even that isn't going to provide any effective barrier. If the NSA or other US Government spooks want to get into the servers, they will, regardless of what hardware it's running on, what software it uses, or what jurisdiction it is located in. Anything that the Foundation does to "protect" itself is just going to be security theatre. Anyone doing anything that the current or future American administrations might object to should keep that in mind. I assume that every place I go on the Internet is already compromised and act accordingly.
Cheers, Craig
On 21 January 2018 at 19:13, Yaroslav Blanter ymbalt@gmail.com wrote:
What about moving to another country? Still not an option?
Cheers Yaroslav
On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Lodewijk lodewijk@effeietsanders.org wrote:
- still don't see the relevance. If better technology is needed, it's
needed - that should be independent of any lobbying preferences. It looks like you're just pushing tangents again.
- You do realize that the FTC and the FEC are very different
organizations? But again, it seems you just used this statement as an opportunity to push a tangent.
Please don't do that.
Thanks, Lodewijk
On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 2:43 PM, James Salsman jsalsman@gmail.com
wrote:
- I don't quite see how your question about servers and switches
relates
to Stephen's statement. Could you explain for us mere mortals how you
link
the two?
The NSA surveillance which was reauthorized by Congress can not depend on eavesdropping alone with new HTTPS cyphers. It needs compromised hardware to work, such as has been included in Dell servers since the Foundation started purchasing them, and the design of which was overseen by the Foundation's CTO, who worked then at Intel. This provides us with the know-how, a teachable moment, and an excellent opportunity to specify and acquire replacement open source hardware which doesn't have the DIETYBOUNCE / System Management Mode OOB / iAMT and related backdoors.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/01/nsa_exploit_of.html
- I somehow missed the commitment by the WMF to research "FEC
requirements
of organized advocates for US political candidates' or anything that suggests that the WMF may advocate for specific political candidates
(which
seems a change of course that would be hard to sweep under the rug).
Could
you quote?
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia_ talk:Conflict_of_interest&diff=prev&oldid=815460492# Note_from_Wikimedia_Legal
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Slaporte_(WMF)# Research_topic_request
Wikimedia-l mailing list, guidelines at: https://meta.wikimedia.org/ wiki/Mailing_lists/Guidelines and https://meta.wikimedia.org/ wiki/Wikimedia-l New messages to: Wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, mailto:wikimedia-l-request@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe
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Hoi, First, what the Foundation does is not in order to protect itself but to protect its readers, its authors.
Second, when you consider security theatre, consider the other countries and then consider the countries where security has a better chance than the USA. Be advised that in many, most countries citizens of other countries are fair game and that the USA is often an active participant in odious regimes in many countries.
Third, when we give up on security we are complicit. We have to consider what companies like Facebook do to create their own hardware and when we can strengthen the move to a state where Cisco hardware is no longer used (Cisco has a bad reputation for open backdoors).
Fourth, what was the use of HTTPS about if all we do is theatre? NO; it is relevant and lets make it more so. Thanks, GerrdM
On 22 January 2018 at 01:45, Craig Franklin cfranklin@halonetwork.net wrote:
I think, as Geni says, that even that isn't going to provide any effective barrier. If the NSA or other US Government spooks want to get into the servers, they will, regardless of what hardware it's running on, what software it uses, or what jurisdiction it is located in. Anything that the Foundation does to "protect" itself is just going to be security theatre. Anyone doing anything that the current or future American administrations might object to should keep that in mind. I assume that every place I go on the Internet is already compromised and act accordingly.
Cheers, Craig
On 21 January 2018 at 19:13, Yaroslav Blanter ymbalt@gmail.com wrote:
What about moving to another country? Still not an option?
Cheers Yaroslav
On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Lodewijk lodewijk@effeietsanders.org wrote:
- still don't see the relevance. If better technology is needed, it's
needed - that should be independent of any lobbying preferences. It
looks
like you're just pushing tangents again.
- You do realize that the FTC and the FEC are very different
organizations? But again, it seems you just used this statement as an opportunity to push a tangent.
Please don't do that.
Thanks, Lodewijk
On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 2:43 PM, James Salsman jsalsman@gmail.com
wrote:
- I don't quite see how your question about servers and switches
relates
to Stephen's statement. Could you explain for us mere mortals how
you
link
the two?
The NSA surveillance which was reauthorized by Congress can not
depend
on eavesdropping alone with new HTTPS cyphers. It needs compromised hardware to work, such as has been included in Dell servers since the Foundation started purchasing them, and the design of which was overseen by the Foundation's CTO, who worked then at Intel. This provides us with the know-how, a teachable moment, and an excellent opportunity to specify and acquire replacement open source hardware which doesn't have the DIETYBOUNCE / System Management Mode OOB /
iAMT
and related backdoors.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/01/nsa_exploit_of.html
- I somehow missed the commitment by the WMF to research "FEC
requirements
of organized advocates for US political candidates' or anything
that
suggests that the WMF may advocate for specific political
candidates
(which
seems a change of course that would be hard to sweep under the
rug).
Could
you quote?
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia_ talk:Conflict_of_interest&diff=prev&oldid=815460492# Note_from_Wikimedia_Legal
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Slaporte_(WMF)# Research_topic_request
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mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l,
mailto:wikimedia-l-request@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe
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Let me just suggest, again, that we should find out how much it would cost to avoid the most widely "baked in" vulnerabilities which are known to state and non-state actor. I can't imagine why that wouldn't be worth it. If the NSA wants private Foundation data, they could send a National Security Letter, ordinary subpoena, or bribe Zimbabwean police to send a subpoena from their Interpol FAX.
On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 12:45 AM, Craig Franklin cfranklin@halonetwork.net wrote:
I think, as Geni says, that even that isn't going to provide any effective barrier. If the NSA or other US Government spooks want to get into the servers, they will, regardless of what hardware it's running on, what software it uses, or what jurisdiction it is located in. Anything that the Foundation does to "protect" itself is just going to be security theatre. Anyone doing anything that the current or future American administrations might object to should keep that in mind. I assume that every place I go on the Internet is already compromised and act accordingly.
Cheers, Craig
On 21 January 2018 at 19:13, Yaroslav Blanter ymbalt@gmail.com wrote:
What about moving to another country? Still not an option?
Cheers Yaroslav
On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 8:38 AM, Lodewijk lodewijk@effeietsanders.org wrote:
- still don't see the relevance. If better technology is needed, it's
needed - that should be independent of any lobbying preferences. It looks like you're just pushing tangents again.
- You do realize that the FTC and the FEC are very different
organizations? But again, it seems you just used this statement as an opportunity to push a tangent.
Please don't do that.
Thanks, Lodewijk
On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 2:43 PM, James Salsman jsalsman@gmail.com
wrote:
- I don't quite see how your question about servers and switches
relates
to Stephen's statement. Could you explain for us mere mortals how you
link
the two?
The NSA surveillance which was reauthorized by Congress can not depend on eavesdropping alone with new HTTPS cyphers. It needs compromised hardware to work, such as has been included in Dell servers since the Foundation started purchasing them, and the design of which was overseen by the Foundation's CTO, who worked then at Intel. This provides us with the know-how, a teachable moment, and an excellent opportunity to specify and acquire replacement open source hardware which doesn't have the DIETYBOUNCE / System Management Mode OOB / iAMT and related backdoors.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/01/nsa_exploit_of.html
- I somehow missed the commitment by the WMF to research "FEC
requirements
of organized advocates for US political candidates' or anything that suggests that the WMF may advocate for specific political candidates
(which
seems a change of course that would be hard to sweep under the rug).
Could
you quote?
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia_ talk:Conflict_of_interest&diff=prev&oldid=815460492# Note_from_Wikimedia_Legal
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Slaporte_(WMF)# Research_topic_request
Wikimedia-l mailing list, guidelines at: https://meta.wikimedia.org/ wiki/Mailing_lists/Guidelines and https://meta.wikimedia.org/ wiki/Wikimedia-l New messages to: Wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, mailto:wikimedia-l-request@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe
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