Fred,
Sorry, there is no us. As far as the United States is concerned they allowed themselves to spy on any person who is not one of US to be speid on. Given that our movement is a global movement, the fact that it is based in the US is incidental. Thanks, GerardM
On 3 September 2013 14:36, Fred Bauder fredbaud@fairpoint.net wrote:
Any censor from the United States or European governments that works directly with us (I have no personal knowledge of this, I just know it has to be) is concerned with classified information, not someone's opinions or factual information about historical events or political personalities.
Detailed information about construction of advanced nuclear weapons or the details of military or intelligence operations cannot be on Wikipedia just as child pornography cannot be; on the other hand, a distorted, or devastatingly accurate picture, of the Iraq War, or Obama, can be.
So, while the details of material removed for legitimate security reasons cannot be published; in China the identity and any personal information we have gathered such as the ip address of an editor and the content of their edits to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 article would be of interest to the security apparatus and classified. Any local employee or volunteer of ours who shared that information with others even within our organization could be prosecuted. It is quite impossible to work with the Chinese government in the manner suggested and maintain a scintilla of integrity. A request by them to remove details about their advanced nuclear weapons or specific details of their military deployments would, of course, be legitimate.
The Chinese government has legitimate reason to avoid extensive public attention to past errors and disasters; one has only to look at the history of the Soviet Union to observe the effect of focusing on past outrages on public morale, but that is their burden to bear not ours to share.
Fred
Hoi,
Fred, what is different in your scenario from what happens in the USA ?
Thanks, GerardM
On 3 September 2013 00:23, Fred Bauder fredbaud@fairpoint.net wrote:
On 31/08/13 15:17, Erik Moeller wrote:
It could be argued that it’s time to draw a line in the sand - if you’re
prohibiting
the use of encryption, you’re effectively not part of the web.
You’re
subverting basic web technologies.
China is not prohibiting encryption. They're prohibiting specific instances of encryption which facilitate circumvention of censorship.
So, what to do? My main suggestion is to organize a broad request
for
comments and input on possible paths forward.
OK, well there's one fairly obvious solution which hasn't been proposed or discussed. It would allow the end-to-end encryption and would allow us to stay as popular in China as we are now.
We could open a data centre in China, send frontend requests from clients in China to that data centre, and comply with local
censorship
and surveillance as required to continue such operation.
It would be kind of like the cooperation we give to the US government at the moment, except specific to readers in China instead of imposed on everyone in the world.
It would allow WMF to monitor censorship and surveillance by being in the request loop. It would give WMF greater influence over local policy, because our staff would be in direct contact with their
staff.
We would be able to deliver clear error messages in place of censored content, instead of a connection reset.
-- Tim Starling
Their orders would be classified; disclosure of them would be a crime. Not a problem for us, but a big problem for staff on the ground in China.
Fred
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