Hi Chris,
On 22 October 2013 05:45, Chris Steipp <csteipp(a)wikimedia.org> wrote:
OAuth does not support this, since the results of an
api call
using OAuth signatures aren't signed (only the request from the OAuth
consumer is signed), so it's possible that an attacker could forge a
response back to the application, and the application would think a
different user was logged in. This is less likely if you're using https for
your api calls, but it's surprisingly hard to get https right [1], even if
you trust all your CA's.
(...)
This is a common issue is being addressed by the OpenID Connect extension
to OAuth2, which allows the application to request information about the
person doing the authorization, and the result is signed by the server to
prevent tampering.
(...)
I'm a bit confused by this -- I was under the impression https would be
enough to confirm I'm actually talking to the WMF's servers. The main
argument in [1] against just using https seems to be it's easy to ignore
invalid certificates. Is there another reason why it's dangerous to assume
you're talking to mw.o if the certificates check out?
Basically, I'm not quite sure whether using OIDC will help alleviate this
problem - you get a response back, but you still have to check the
signature! And with the ease of not checking the signature, you're
basically back to the same problem with not checking the ssl certificate.
Nonetheless, I think it's useful to add an authentication mechanism that
follows a standard - which is clearly not the case with the current
'api.php?meta=userinfo' calls.
Merlijn
[1]
http://blog.astrumfutura.com/2010/10/do-cryptographic-signatures-beat-ssltl…