We shouldn't throw annoying text/graphics at people who probably *cant* upgrade.
-Chad On Jun 3, 2011 4:27 PM, "Mono mium" monomium@gmail.com wrote:
Why not?
On Fri, Jun 3, 2011 at 1:19 PM, Huib Laurens sterkebak@gmail.com wrote:
Thats completly not the point.
2011/6/3, Mono mium monomium@gmail.com:
We don't want to use Microsoft's, whatever we do, because it promotes
their
own borked browser IE9.
On Fri, Jun 3, 2011 at 11:30 AM, Mark Dilley markwdilley@gmail.com
wrote:
<aside from main conversation>
Would it be a good community gesture to join Microsoft in trying to eradicate IE6?
or to not join them and put up a more general banner
and move on?
</aside from main conversation>
On 03Jun2011, at 10:53 AM, Brion Vibber wrote:
On Thu, Jun 2, 2011 at 5:21 PM, Tim Starling <tstarling@wikimedia.org wrote:
On 03/06/11 06:56, Brion Vibber wrote: > For 1) I'm honestly a bit willing to sacrifice a few IE 6 users at > this > point; the vendor's dropped support, shipped three major versions,
and
is
> actively campaigning to get the remaining users to upgrade. :) But
I
get
> protecting, so if we can find a workaround that's ok.
We can't really do this without sending "Vary: User-Agent", which would completely destroy our cache hit ratio. For people who use
Squid
with our X-Vary-Options patch, it would be possible to use a very
long
X-Vary-Options header to single out IE 6 requests, but not everyone has that patch.
I'm really thinking more along the lines of: if someone's an IE
6-or-below
user they have hundreds of other exploit vectors staring them in the face too, and we can't protect them against many of them -- or ANY of them
if
they're visiting other sites than just an up-to-date MediaWiki.
The cost of this fix has been immense; several versions of the fix
with
varying levels of disruption on production sites, both for IE 6 users and non-IE 6 users, and several weeks of delay on the 1.17.0 release.
I'd be willing to accept a few drive-by downloads for IE 6 users;
it's
not
ideal but it's something that their antivirus tools etc will already
be
watching out for, that end-users already get trained to beware of,
and
that
will probably *still* be exploitable on other web sites that they
visit
anyway.
The main issue here is that we don't a wide variety of web servers
set
up for testing. We know that Apache lets you detect %2E versus dot
via
$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], but we don't know if any other web servers
do
that.
Note that checking for %2E alone is not sufficient, a lot of installations (including Wikimedia) have an alias /wiki -> /w/index.php which can be used to exploit action=raw.
Well that should be fine; as long as we can see the "/wiki?/foo.bat" then
we
can identify that it doesn't contain an unencoded dot in the path.
It sounds like simply checking REQUEST_URI when available would eliminate
a
huge portion of our false positives that affect real-world
situations.
Apache is still the default web server in most situations for most folks, and of course runs our own production servers.
> Are there any additional exploit vectors for API output other than > HTML tags > mixed unescaped into JSON?
Yes, all other content types, as I said above.
Only as drive-by downloads, or as things that execute without
interaction?
I think the current solution in trunk, plus the redirect idea that I've been discussing with Roan, is our best bet for now, unless someone wants to investigate $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'].
*nod* Checking REQUEST_URI is probably the first thing we should do
when
it's available.
If there is an actual problem with ForeignAPIRepo then we can look
at
server-side special cases for it. But r89248 should allow all API requests that have a dotless value in their last GET parameter, and
a
quick review of ForeignAPIRepo in 1.16 and trunk indicates that it always sends such requests.
Yay! That's one less thing to worry about. :D
Since we're talking about discarded solutions for this, maybe it's worth noting that I also investigated using a Content-Disposition header. The vulnerability involves an incorrect cache filename, and it's possible to override the cache filename using a Content-Disposition "filename" parameter. The reason I gave up on it is because we already use Content-Disposition for wfStreamFile():
header( "Content-Disposition:inline;filename*=utf-8'$wgLanguageCode'" . urlencode( basename(
$fname
) ) );
IE 6 doesn't understand the charset specification, so it ignores the header and goes back to detecting the extension.
Good to know.
-- brion _______________________________________________ Wikitech-l mailing list Wikitech-l@lists.wikimedia.org https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l
Wikitech-l mailing list Wikitech-l@lists.wikimedia.org https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l
Wikitech-l mailing list Wikitech-l@lists.wikimedia.org https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l
-- Verzonden vanaf mijn mobiele apparaat
Kind regards,
Huib Laurens WickedWay.nl
Webhosting the wicked way.
Wikitech-l mailing list Wikitech-l@lists.wikimedia.org https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l
Wikitech-l mailing list Wikitech-l@lists.wikimedia.org https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l