On 9/30/14, Derric Atzrott datzrott@alizeepathology.com wrote:
Alright, this is a long email, and it acts to basically summarise all of the discussions that have already happened on this topic. I'll be posting a copy of it to Mediawiki.org as well so that it will be easier to find out about what has already been proposed in the future.
There is a policy side to this, Meta has the "No open proxies" policy, which would need to be changed, but I doubt that such policies will be changed unless those of us on this list can come up with a good way to allow Tor users to edit. If we can come up with a way that solves most of the problems the community has, then I think there is a good chance that this policy can be changed.
I'd like to add an idea I've been thinking about to make TOR more acceptable.
A big part of the problem is that there are hundreds (thousands?) of exit nodes, so if someone is being bad, they just have to wait 5 minutes to get a new one, making it very hard to block them.
So what we could do, is map all tor connections to appear (To MW) as if they are coming from a few private IP addresses. This way its easy to block temporarily (in case of a whole slew of vandalism comes in), the political decision on whether to block or not becomes a local problem (The best kind of solution to a problem is the type that makes it somebody else's problem ;) I would personally hope that admins would only give short term block to such an address during waves of vandalism, but ultimately it would be up to them.
To be explicit, the potential idea is as follows: *User access via tor *MediaWiki sees its a tor request *Try to do limited browser fingerprinting, to perhaps mitigate the affect of an unclued user not using tor browser being bad ruining it for everyone. Say take a hash of the user-agent and various accept headers, and turn it into a number between 1 and 16. *Make MW think the IP is 172.16.0.<number from previous step>
Then all the tor edits are all together, and easy to notice if somebody is abusing them, and easy for a local admin to block all at once if need be.
This would also make most of the rate limiting apply against all people accessing via tor instead of doing rate limiting per exit node, which is probably a good thing, and would prevent repetitive abuse, people registering 10 billion accounts, etc. If we did this, we may also want to make pretty much every action trigger a captcha for those addresses (perhaps even if you are logged in from those addresses), instead of the current lax captcha triggering (On the bright side, our captchas are actually readable by people, unlike say cloudflare's (recaptcha) which I can't make heads or tails of).
If there are further concerns about potential abuse, we could tag all edits coming from TOR (including if user is logged in) with an edit tag of "tor" (Although that might be in violation of privacy policy by exposing how a logged in user is accessing the site).
Thoughts? Would this actually make TOR be acceptable to the Wikipedians?
--bawolff