I present these not as edicts from above, but rather to show that completely blocking Tor is not an edict from above:
"All I'm saying is that Tor could segregate users easily enough into two clouds: "We sorta trust these ones, more or less, a little bit, but no guarantees" -- "We don't trust these ones, we don't know them".
Users in the first group could be allowed access to Wikipedia because their overall level of bad behavior would be tolerable. Users in the second group would still be blocked."
http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Sep-2005/msg00274.html
"First, having a login id doesn't mean that we trust you, it just means that you've signed up. One of the reasons that we don't _require_ login ids, actually, is that it allows jerks to self-select by being too lazy to login before they vandalize. :-)
But, we could do something like: allow non-logged in posts, and allowed posts with Tor *for trusted accounts*, but not non-logged-in posts with Tor, and not logged-in-but-not-yet-trusted accounts with Tor.
Still, there's a flaw: this means you have to come around to Wikipedia in an non-Tor manner long enough for us to trust you, which pretty much blows the whole point of privacy to start with."
http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Sep-2005/msg00292.html
Anthony