MacGyverMagic/Mgm wrote:
If it is against policy then why aren't we blocking those proxies?
We are, but the problem is that new ones keep popping up all the time. Still, it *should* be possible to automatically block editing from *most* Tor exit nodes; if Torstatus can keep up with them, we should be able to do the same. A few nodes would probably be missed because they're multihomed or behind transparent proxies, but I don't believe those are all that common.
Of course, that would only solve the problem for Tor, not for the countless zombie computers and misconfigured proxies that make up the majority of the proxy-blocking workload. So I suppose preemptively blocking Tor may not be seen as a major priority from that perspective.
And if proxy editing is against policy we should block AOL too as it is basically an open proxy to with all the IP switching going on.
IIRC, we did, the moment AOL started allowing people other than their direct customers to use their proxies. There were calls for blocking them, at least anon-only, even before that, but for various reasons -- including the number of AOL customers that would've been hit as well as vague promises from AOL that something would be done about it real soon now -- it never got done back then. (Not here, anyway; the German Wikipedia, at least, did block them.)
The issue was finally resolved when AOL eventually got their proxies configured to send us proper X-Forwarded-For headers and we added them to the list of trusted proxies from which we accept such headers. Thus, users editing now via AOL's proxies have their edits assigned to their actual IP address rather than that of the proxy.
(Needless to say, that won't happen with Tor; their very purpose is to make it impossible to determine the real IP addresses of their users.)