Nuria Ruiz wrote:
.... on our end we need buffer time that allows us to know that should there be a bug we can reprocess pageviews if needed (this does happen). That buffer time is now 60 days and perhaps it could be a bit smaller but it is still going to be a matter of weeks, not days for which the raw data needs to be available.
Do the advantages of keeping unanonymized IP reader logs for potential debugging needs outweigh the privacy disadvantages?
What are the outcomes impacting users of the hypothetical loss of pageviews data compared to a PII leak?
On Fri, Nov 11, 2016 at 8:11 AM, James Salsman jsalsman@gmail.com wrote:
Pine wrote:
I tend to think that checkusers will need the plain IP addresses....
I am not suggesting removing the IP addresses or proxy information from POST requests as checkuser requires.
We need to anonymize both IP addresses and proxy information with a secure hash if we want to keep each GET request's geolocation, to be compliant with the Privacy Policy. The Privacy Policy is the most prominent policy on the far left on the footer of every page served by every editable project, and says explicitly that consent is required for the use of geolocation. The Privacy and other policies make it clear that POST requests and Visual Editor submissions aren't going to be anonymized.
However, geolocations for POST edit and visual editor submissions still require explicit consent which we have no way to obtain at present. Editors' geolocations as they edit are very useful for research, but by the same token have the most serious privacy concerns. Obtaining consent to store geolocation seems like it would interfere with, complicate, and disrupt editing. If geolocation is stored with anonymized IP addresses for GETs but not POSTs or Visual Editor submissions, both could easily be recovered because of simultaneously interleaved GET and POST requests for the same article are unavoidable.
Do we have any privacy experts on staff who can give these issues a thorough analysis in light of all the issues raised in https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450006 ?
If Ops needs IP addresses, they should be able to use synthetic POST requests, as far as I can tell. If they anticipate a need for non-anonymous GET requests, then perhaps some kind of a debugging switch which could be used on a short term basis where an IP range or mask could be entered to allow matching addresses to log non-anonymously before expiring in an hour would solve any anticipated need?