[WikiEN-l] Wikipedia:Paradoxes

[Jay Litwyn]

Please allow me to start this proof from scratch and try to go from the 
paradox that is most interesting to the simple answer of no, and 
generalizing it to all paradoxes, refuting objections in a monologue, 
because it does not seem to contain equally powerful participants. Can God 
crush an uncrushable stone? In mechanically verifiable predicate logic 
notation, I can write "exists(God) implies not exists(UnCrushableStone)". 
Spelled out in plain English, that means God can do any thing, and that is 
singular, because if God can do any combination of things, then he can 
contradict himself and crush the stone, which does not allow for a 
self-consistent proof, because that allows God to prove that the uncrushable 
stone did not exist in the first place. exists(UnCrushableStone) implies not 
exists(God). Translation: If the uncrushable stone exists, then God does 
not, because the stone's existence implies something God cannot do and God 
can do any thing. Either God exists or the UnCrushableStone exists (and not 
both). exists(God) xor exists(UnCrushableStone). For God to crush the 
uncrushable stone requires both God and the uncrushable stone to be present 
at the same time. not(exists(God) and exists(UnCrushableStone)). Their 
existence is mutually exclusive. In any true paradox that demands a contest 
between two beings with an ultimate power, and where those two beings 
exclude each other, the answer is no, because those two beings cannot exist 
at once. So, what happens if God creates the uncrushable stone? He cannot do 
that without changing himself in the same move. In creating the uncrushable 
stone, he creates something that is not possible, so God would no longer be 
omnipotent. If God is no longer omnipotent, then no God is.
_______
"Another round, Mr. Descartes?" "I think not," said Descartes, who promptly 
vanished.
"Can you think?", I asked, putting Descartes before the horse.
We are Descartes of Borg: We assimilate, therefore we are.