[WikiEN-l] Jayjg: Abusing CheckUser for political ends?

Slim Virgin slimvirgin at gmail.com
Sat Jun 16 02:00:42 UTC 2007


On 6/15/07, Kat Walsh <kat at mindspillage.org> wrote:
> On 6/15/07, Slim Virgin <slimvirgin at gmail.com> wrote:
> > On 6/15/07, Kat Walsh <kat at mindspillage.org> wrote:
> > > On 6/15/07, Slim Virgin <slimvirgin at gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > On 6/15/07, Kat Walsh <kat at mindspillage.org> wrote:
> > > > > I realize this is a minority opinion and I've been outnumbered on it
> > > > > before, but there it is. If I were not completely open about who I am
> > > > > on this site, and did want to maintain anonymity, I would probably
> > > > > want to be using TOR myself.
> > > >
> > > > Kat, the issue of editing with proxies is different from wanting to be
> > > > an admin and carry on using them.  We have issues with users running
> > > > more than one admin account, and one of the ways they're allegedly
> > > > doing this is by using open proxies. Being able to log an admin's real
> > > > IP address is the only tiny bit of accountability the Foundation has
> > > > regarding admins.
> > >
> > > I don't actually think it's very different, editing and being an
> > > admin. Admins do not have much technical power beyond that of ordinary
> > > editors; what they do have could just as easily be abused by someone
> > > editing from a public library, cybercafe, or other public terminal,
> > > and yet we don't ban those accounts from becoming admins.
> > >
> > The latter's true, but checkusers can at least see their location. If
> > you have two admin accounts making the same kinds of edits, with the
> > same voice, and both editing from location X (one from a library, the
> > other from an internet cafe), it's a good indication you've got a
> > problem.
> >
> > Trojan admin accounts can do a lot of damage. They can view and copy
> > deleted material; unblock abusive users; unprotect pages that would be
> > better left protected; cause endless arguments on AN/I by questioning
> > other admins; log and hand out conversations on the admins' channel,
> > and doubtless other things I haven't thought of.
>
> I still don't see why someone using an anonymizing proxy, who has
> maintained a consistent identity, does not resemble another user, and
> otherwise does not ping anyone's trouble radar, is more of a risk here
> than any other admin for whom we do not know any personal details.

We have some details for most admins, if only the IP address if it's
needed. That allows checkusers to look for sockpuppetry, and it allows
the Foundation to respond to a request from a court for the admin's
details in case of libel, for example. It's minimal accountability,
and to take even that away would mean that someone who was permabanned
could easily be up and running several admin accounts a few months
later, and could cause a lot of trouble, with almost no way of getting
caught. Look at Wikitruth, for example, and the reposting of possibly
libelous or distressing material. Look at the trouble caused by people
posting IRC logs from the admins channel.

I think the important point is that it's a violation of policy to edit
with open proxies, so it's a bit rich for an editor to ask to become
an admin, who'll be able to block others for policy violations, while
violating it themselves every single time they edit. If they want to
change the policy, they should try to do that openly before standing.



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