On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 10:13 AM, Tyler Romeo <tylerromeo(a)gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 9:59 PM, C. Scott Ananian
<cananian(a)wikimedia.org
wrote:
Because the other TLS 1.0 ciphers are *even
worse*.
https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/03/19/rc4-in-tls-is-br…
...except they're not (in all major browsers and the latest stable openssl
and gnutls implementations).
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=665814
I can't tell if your emails are trolling us or not, but you're being
pretty
aggressive. Things take time and you're oversimplifying issues. It's better
to be calm and rational when implementing stuff like this.
I mentioned on wikimedia-l that I'd be enabling GCM ciphers relatively
soon. You even opened a bug after I mentioned it. I didn't get a chance at
Wikimania to do it and I'm currently on vacation. They'll be enabled when I
get back on Monday or Tuesday.
We released a blog post about our plans and are having an ops meeting about
this next week. We'll update <https://wikitech.wikimedia.org/wiki/Https>
when we've more firmly set our plans.
To this specific email's point, though: RC4 still protects BEAST for
browsers that will always be vulnerable and those that aren't will support
TLS 1.2 soon enough (which is the correct solution). Let's not make old
browsers vulnerable to make newer browsers slightly more secure for a short
period of time.
- Ryan