[Wikimedia-l] Wikimedia and the politics of encryption

[Fred Bauder]

And from that assertion what practical action or policy should follow?

Fred

> Fred,
>
> Sorry, there is no us. As far as the United States is concerned they
> allowed themselves to spy on any person who is not one of US to be speid
> on. Given that our movement is a global movement, the fact that it is
> based
> in the US is incidental.
> Thanks,
>       GerardM
>
>
> On 3 September 2013 14:36, Fred Bauder <fredbaud at fairpoint.net> wrote:
>
>> Any censor from the United States or European governments that works
>> directly with us (I have no personal knowledge of this, I just know it
>> has to be) is concerned with classified information, not someone's
>> opinions or factual information about historical events or political
>> personalities.
>>
>> Detailed information about construction of advanced nuclear weapons or
>> the details of military or intelligence operations cannot be on
>> Wikipedia
>> just as child pornography cannot be; on the other hand, a distorted, or
>> devastatingly accurate picture, of the Iraq War, or Obama, can be.
>>
>> So, while the details of material removed for legitimate security
>> reasons
>> cannot be published; in China the identity and any personal information
>> we have gathered such as the ip address of an editor and the content of
>> their edits to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 article would be
>> of
>> interest to the security apparatus and classified. Any local employee
>> or
>> volunteer of ours who shared that information with others even within
>> our
>> organization could be prosecuted. It is quite impossible to work with
>> the
>> Chinese government in the manner suggested and maintain a scintilla of
>> integrity. A request by them to remove details about their advanced
>> nuclear weapons or specific details of their military deployments
>> would,
>> of course, be legitimate.
>>
>> The Chinese government has legitimate reason to avoid extensive public
>> attention to past errors and disasters; one has only to look at the
>> history of the Soviet Union to observe the effect of focusing on past
>> outrages on public morale, but that is their burden to bear not ours to
>> share.
>>
>> Fred
>>
>> > Hoi,
>> >
>> > Fred, what is different in your scenario from what happens in the USA
>> ?
>> >
>> > Thanks,
>> >       GerardM
>> >
>> >
>> > On 3 September 2013 00:23, Fred Bauder <fredbaud at fairpoint.net>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> >> > On 31/08/13 15:17, Erik Moeller wrote:
>> >> >> It could be argued
>> >> >> that it’s time to draw a line in the sand - if
>> you’re
>> >> prohibiting
>> >> >> the
>> >> >> use of encryption, you’re effectively not part
>> of the web.
>> >> You’re
>> >> >> subverting basic web technologies.
>> >> >
>> >> > China is not prohibiting encryption. They're prohibiting specific
>> >> > instances of encryption which facilitate circumvention of
>> censorship.
>> >> >
>> >> >> So, what to do? My main suggestion is to organize a broad request
>> >> for
>> >> >> comments and input on possible paths forward.
>> >> >
>> >> > OK, well there's one fairly obvious solution which hasn't been
>> >> > proposed or discussed. It would allow the end-to-end encryption
>> and
>> >> > would allow us to stay as popular in China as we are now.
>> >> >
>> >> > We could open a data centre in China, send frontend requests from
>> >> > clients in China to that data centre, and comply with local
>> >> censorship
>> >> > and surveillance as required to continue such operation.
>> >> >
>> >> > It would be kind of like the cooperation we give to the US
>> government
>> >> > at the moment, except specific to readers in China instead of
>> imposed
>> >> > on everyone in the world.
>> >> >
>> >> > It would allow WMF to monitor censorship and surveillance by being
>> in
>> >> > the request loop. It would give WMF greater influence over local
>> >> > policy, because our staff would be in direct contact with their
>> >> staff.
>> >> > We would be able to deliver clear error messages in place of
>> censored
>> >> > content, instead of a connection reset.
>> >> >
>> >> > -- Tim Starling
>> >>
>> >> Their orders would be classified; disclosure of them would be a
>> crime.
>> >> Not a problem for us, but a big problem for staff on the ground in
>> >> China.
>> >>
>> >> Fred
>> >>
>> >>
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>>
>>
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>