NPOV and credibility (was Re: [WikiEN-l] Original research)

Joseph Reagle reagle at mit.edu
Fri Dec 10 16:43:28 UTC 2004


On Friday 10 December 2004 16:06, Jimmy (Jimbo) Wales wrote:
> I don't see any difficulty at all here, as long as we abandon the idea
> that neutrality requires epistemological nihilism.

This notion of "credible" reminds me of "confidence" discussed in the 3rd 
bullet below in light of global climate change:

http://goatee.net/2003/01.html#_13mo
°03.01.13.mo | The Politics of Science and Vice Versa
...
   I want to understand to what
   degree, if any, something can be commonly known. This is what I've
   learned:
     * An understanding of fact and theory based on Moran/Gould's
       "Evolution is a Fact and a Theory",
          + There are observations of facts about the state of the
            Universe. We know that the sun moves in the sky, rising and
            falling -- regardless of some Biblical interpretations.
            Objects on earth fall. The earth has existed for billions
            of years with varied life forms living upon it. And this
            planet is undergoing substantive climate change.
          + There are theories that explain the relationships between
            observations, posit mechanisms, and predict future events.
            The earth orbits the sun according to gravitational
            principles that also govern the path of the apple falling
            from my hand. Our present continents developed via
            geological processes including plate tectonics. And humans
            have, in part, effected climatic change and its probable
            detrimental effects. And just because something is a theory
            doesn't mean that it is dismissable or that every "theory"
            is equally capable.
          + There is evidence that determines our confidence in both
            facts and theories. One would think the nature of
            ascertaining facts via observation is trivial, but we must
            be wary of hindsight bias, confirmation bias, placebo
            effects, and all manner of other prejudicial phenomena.
            With respect to theory, confidence is determined by the
            nature of its assumptions, testability, the quality of the
            underlying data/observations, and the theory's explanatory
            power. Theories are wrestled with by the scientific
            community, tested, repeated, confirmed, and settled upon by
            scientific consensus and ultimately judged by historical
            hindsight.
            However, the relationship between fact and theory is
            complicated because we often can not perfectly observe the
            state of something, such as the surface air temperatures
            and thickness of the Arctic ice cap. We then must take
            samples and extrapolate, which now, in part, constitutes a
            theory about the validity of the extrapolation until the
            extrapolation is considered so conclusive as to engender a
            fact. For example, only the irrational or obstinate would
            dispute the observation of fact that it is very cold in
            Boston today absent readings from thermometers in every
            square foot of Boston.
          + Anything can, and unfortunately will, be disputed. Some can
            argue that the aliens have placed the image of the falling
            apple in my mind or that God placed fossils in the earth to
            test my faith. However, these pronouncements are useless.

     In science "fact" can only mean "confirmed to such a degree that
     it would be perverse to withhold provisional consent." I suppose
     that apples might start to rise tomorrow, but the possibility
     does not merit equal time in physics classrooms." - Stephen J.
     Gould, Evolution as Fact and Theory; Discover, May 1981.
            The above reliance upon aliens and gods to explain a
            falling apple as fact is absurd because they defy every
            other assumption necessary to daily life in this world:
            that the majority of humans can trust their most basic
            senses. As a theory, these pronouncements can not be tested
            and they offer us no novel explanations of the past nor
            predictions for the future. Science is the difficult
            process of gaining a useful understanding of our world
            while avoiding an alarming collection of biases,
            self-interested prejudices, and cognitive blind-spots.
            Furthermore, scientists can, should, and do argue about
            particular nuances without necessarily undermining the
            confidence of a larger understanding. For instance,
            scientists might discuss gradualism versus punctuated
            equilibrium without contesting the geological records,
            fossil records, nor natural selection. Or they may come to
            find that an understanding only applies to previously known
            assumptions, but new assumptions (e.g., non-Euclidean
            geometry, relativistic time/space, the quantum scale, etc.)
            require new observations and explanations under the new
            conditions.
     * As I've written before, "We can never know everything." We all
       can't be experts on everything, so we often need to rely upon
       credible authority while remaining critical and skeptical, but
       never dismissive.
     * It's no good being dogmatic. I've found the criticism of the
       IPCC policy summaries (distinct from the actual report) to be
       interesting and the recent debate regarding ice sampling in the
       Arctic worthy of further research.
...



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