[Foundation-l] Re: check user policy/Tor

[Anthony DiPierro]

On 11/3/05, Amgine <amgine at saewyc.net> wrote:
>
> On 11/2/05, Amgine <amgine at saewyc.net <http://saewyc.net>
> <http://mail.wikipedia.org/mailman/listinfo/foundation-l>> wrote:
>
> >> For these reasons, I would personally be in favour of blocking
> >> access, or at least editing, to all anonymizing services.
> >
> > I would say that more important than trying to identify each user's
> > IP and disallowing anonymity -- which strikes me as the wrong way
> > to go -- would be asking users (presumed anonymous) to verify their
> > goodwill and interest in the projects by working in a sandboxed
> > area, or submitting time-delayed changes, until they had
> > demonstrated a reasonable threshhold of good faith; at which point
> > they could vandalize and be quickly blocked, having spent much more
> > time getting to that point than the vandal-fighters did blocking
> > them.
> >
> > Anonymity serves useful purposes; we should try to preserve those
> > while promoting the productive development of the projects.
> >
> > To be mergist about these ideas... one could offer users both
> > options. 1) edit under a privacy policy which disallows anonymity,
> > or 2) edit anonymously, first passing through a sandbox stage to
> > demonstrate that you are not a bot and are acting in good faith.
> >
> > + SJ +
>
> The amount of intervention required to do as you suggest - check all time
> delayed entries for vandalism, create a system to over come edit conflicts
> which develop during the time delay (more "magic solutions"), create and
> implement a policy covering "reasonable threshold of good faith",
> managing anon user privileges who meet that threshold - would cost more
> than the current vandal fighting does. The point is to reduce the existing
> cost significantly.

 I agree with this completely. It's just as easy to revert an edit as it is
to approve one, so I don't see any sense in delaying entries. Yes, it means
the version of the page presented to the public won't be as likely to be
vandalized, but I think the difficulty in programming such a fork would
outweigh the benefits. Some sort of "reviewed version" of the entire
encyclopedia would be nice, but if you figure out how to do that might as
well review *all* edits, not just ones coming through anonymizing proxies.
 That said, there is nearly complete agreement that there should be a
certain class of user/IP address combinations that should be able to edit
even when the IP address is blocked. I think something like an anonymizing
proxy would be a perfect type of IP block for that situation. It makes no
sense for longstanding users (even admins!) to be blocked from editing
simply because they're accessing the system through a proxy.

The proposed model allows for anonymity except when an IP is investigated
> for wrong doing, and would probably reduce time cost to sites by
> preventing anonymized IPs from editing maliciously. By implementing a
> system which requires monitoring, decision-making, and user privilege
> management you would create an onerous time task for smaller projects and
> likely create opportunities for conflict which are unnecessary.
>
> Amgine
>
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