I should add that, for all that I agree with Shapiro's worries about Justice Stevens's embrace of the Earl of Oxford theory--
"When one of the most revered legal minds and leaders of this nation works to legitimate one conspiracy theory, it makes it much easier for lesser minds to do the same with other conspiracy theories (and as a New Yorker, writing as the 10th anniversary of the destruction of the Twin Towers approaches, I am especially sensitive to this). A brief glance at our nation’s political landscape (in which, for example, so many believe that President Obama is not American, and even doubt the documentary evidence of his birth certificate) confirms that conspiracy thinking is not a neutral activity. Like it or not, your public expression of interest in the Oxford question has, to my mind at least, disturbing political implications."
--I also find myself in agreement with Stevens's observation that the predilections of the leading Oxonian conspiracy theorist, J. Thomas Looney, tell us nothing at all about the merit (or lack of merit) of his arguments. As Stevens wrote, "The fact that Looney may have despised democracy seems to me to be irrelevant to the validity of any arguments he may have made either casting doubt on Shakespeare’s authorship or supporting the hypothesis that Oxford play a role in writing the plays." That's a sound epistemological point, and it makes me feel a little better about this quirk of Justice Stevens.
Mike