2015-04-27 18:51 GMT+03:00 Chris Steipp
<csteipp(a)wikimedia.org>rg>:
Hi Strainu,
Thanks for the additional information Chris!
We were trying to balance how much data vs summary information to give to
people, but you can find the issues vs. resolution table here:
https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Security_Team/Check/iSEC_Assessmen…
I was happy to see that some of the issues found by iSEC was
previously identified in-house. However, I couldn't help noticing that
https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T64685 lingered for almost an year
(or more, I'm not sure if the bugzilla import kept the dates) and the
patch was only merged after this report found the bug as well. We all
know the WMF is slow in merging patches, especially from outsiders,
but shouldn't you have *some* guidelines (or preferably rules) on the
time that a security bug can stay opened?
Hi Stainu,
I specifically addressed this in the "What did we learn?" section of the
blog post. We are hiring to make sure we can address issues faster.
In this particular case, if we had any indication that the issue was known
outside the WMF, or being abused, I would have raised the priority and
addressed it ahead of other issues that I'm working on.
I'm not trying to start yet another endless fight
between WMF staff
and the community, but the tendency in the last few years has been for
the researchers to release the vulnerabilities after a certain time
regardless if the software has been patched or not. Seeing MW exploits
in the wild and knowing that developers had a chance to fix them and
didn't does not help WMF's image.
Regards,
Strainu
For the issue you pointed out in particular, we have
https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T85856 where you can follow the
discussion. The end result was that this was a low severity issue, we're
definitely not going to do away with user javascript, instead we may add
a
warning if we can find a useful UX experience for
the user.
On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 8:35 AM, Strainu <strainu10(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> I personally find one of the suggestions in the report worrying:
>
> "Eliminate custom CSS/JavaScript. iSEC found multiple issues with the
> custom JavaScript system.
> This system appears to pose significant risk for relatively small
> benefit. As such, iSEC recommends
> that Wikimedia Foundation deprecate this functionality and allow users
> instead to customize their
> experience on the client side using browser extensions such as
> Greasemonkey or Tampermonkey."
>
> This is related to one of the problems identified by the team: "Users
> can inspect each other's personal JavaScript"
>
> While the custom JS is used by a relatively small number of users, the
> ability to learn and copy another user's scripts has played an
> important part in the development(and maintenance) of scripts that are
> now considered essential by many Wikimedians (twinkle and wikied come
> to mind).
>
> Furthermore, replacing those script with Greasemonkey scripts would
> lead to a "black market" of Wiki-scripts shared through channels
> external to our sites. Those scripts would be even more prone to
> social engineering attacks and could endanger our user's security.
>
> I would like to know if the WMF is indeed considering completely
> dropping the custom JS feature and if so, what is the timeline for
> this change?
>
> Thanks,
> Strainu
>
> 2015-04-21 4:41 GMT+03:00 Pine W <wiki.pine(a)gmail.com>om>:
> > Thanks for your work on this, Chris.
> >
> > Forwarding to Wikitech-l.
> >
> > Pine
> > On Apr 20, 2015 4:58 PM, "Chris Steipp" <csteipp(a)wikimedia.org>
wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> On Apr 20, 2015 4:13 PM, "Andrew Sherman"
<asherman(a)wikimedia.org>
> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > Hello Everyone,
> >> >
> >> > We just published "Improving the security of our users on
Wikimedia
> >> sites" to the blog. URL:
> >> >
> >> >
>
https://blog.wikimedia.org/2015/04/20/improving-security-for-our-users/
> >> >
> >> > Thanks to Chris for writing and helping us edit this post.
> >> >
> >> > Below are some proposed social media messages. Tweak as needed.
> >> >
> >> > Twitter
> >> >
> >> > We teamed up with @iSECPartners and @OpenTechFund to assess the
> security
> >> of our sites. Check out the report here [link]
> >> >
> >> > FB/G+
> >> >
> >> > We teamed up with iSEC Partners to assess the security of our sites
> and
> >> protect the privacy of our users. Their engineers developed attacks
> against
> >> the current version of MediaWiki to identify security flaws, in a new
> >> report sponsored by the Open Technology Fund. [link]
> >>
> >> Maybe just "MediaWiki" instead of "the current version of
MediaWiki",
> >> since we did a release to specifically fix issues that they found.
Might
> confuse some people as is.
>
> >
> > Thanks,
> > --
> > Andrew Sherman
> > Digital Communications | Wikimedia Foundation
> >
> > E: asherman(a)wikimedia.org
> > WMF: ASherman (WMF)
>
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>
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>
>
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