Prior to TOR being enabled we need to be able to flag both logged in and
logged out edits made via TOR.
On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Brian Wolff <bawolff(a)gmail.com> wrote:
On Oct 1, 2014 11:40 AM, "Brad Jorsch
On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 10:29 AM, Brian Wolff <bawolff(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> On Oct 1, 2014 10:55 AM, "Risker" <risker.wp(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> > This is something that has to be discussed *on the projects
> > not on mailing lists that have
(comparatively) very low participation
> > active editors.
> Unless people want to trial on mw.org
(assuming there is dev buy in,
are there yet)
receive the level of vandalism and other unhelpful edits
people would like to use Tor to avoid IP blocking
in making those edits)
that it would make for a useful test?
If we are testing something potentially very disruptive, no harm starting
small. At the very least it would show if we could enable tor on mw.org
The results could help decide if further testing on more "real" wikis is
> > There also needs to be a good answer to the "attribution problem"
> > long been identified as a secondary concern related to Tor and other
> > systems. The absence of a good answer to this issue may be
itself to derail any proposed trial.
Which problem is that?
If I understand it correctly, right now we attribute edits made without
account to the IP address. Allowing edits via Tor
should probably not be
attributing such edits to the exit node's IP.
This quite frankly seems like a contrived problem. A random (normal) ip
address hardly associates an edit to a person unless you steal an isps
records. Wait a year and it would probably be impossible to figure out who
owned some random dynamic ip address no matter how hard you tried. I dont
think attributing edits to an exit node introduces any new attribution
issues that are not already present.
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