My example means that unless TOR is hard blocked attackers can create 6
accounts per day on there home IP and just wait till they go stale and use
6 attack accounts per day. There isn't a need for infinite accounts, just
that soft blocking is pointless in this case
On Wednesday, October 1, 2014, Brian Wolff <bawolff(a)gmail.com> wrote:
On Oct 1, 2014 3:56 PM, "Derric Atzrott"
Another idea for a potential technical solution, this one provided
by the user Mirimir on the Tor mailing list. I thought this was
actually a pretty good idea.
> Wikimedia could authenticate users with GnuPG keys. As part of the
> process of creating a new account, Wikimedia could randomly specify the
> key ID (or even a longer piece of the fingerprint) of the key that the
> user needs to generate. Generating the key would require arbitrarily
> great effort, but would impose negligible cost on Wikimedia or users
> during subsequent use. Although there's nothing special about such
proof of work, they're more generally useful.
As a proof of work I think it works out pretty well. The cost of
a key with a given fingerprint is non-trivial,
but low enough that
someone wishing to create an account to edit might well go through with
it if they knew it would only be a one-time thing.
This doesn't completely eliminate the issue of socks, but honestly if we
make the key generation time reasonably long, it would probably deter
most socks as they might as well just drive to the nearest Starbucks.
Someone else on the Tor mailing list suggested that we basically relax
IPBE, which while not on topic for this list, I thought I'd mention
just because it has been mentioned. They actually basically
described our current system, except with the getting the IPBE stage
a lot easier.
The following was also pointed out to me:
[I]t's also trivial to evade using proxies,
with or without Tor.
Blocking Tor (or even all known proxies) only stops the clueless.
Anyone serious about evading a block could just use a private proxy
on AWS (via Tor). [snip] The bottom line is that blocking Tor harms
numerous innocent users, and by no means excludes seriously malicious
I did respond to this to explain our concerns, which is what netted
the GPG idea. Does anyone see any glaringly obvious problems with
requiring an easily blockable and difficult to create proof of work
to edit via Tor?
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The problem with proof of work things is that they kind of have the wrong
kind of scarcity for this problem.
*someone legit wants to edit, takes them hours to be able to. (Which is not
*someone wants to abuse the system, spend a couple months before hand
generating the work offline, use all at once for thousand strong sock
puppet army. (Which makes the system ineffective at preventing abuse)
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