How is this related to the foundation? On Wed, Jul 31, 2013 at 9:22 PM, Fred Bauder &lt;fredbaud(a)fairpoint.net&gt; wrote: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-… -- Met vriendelijke groet, Huib Laurens _______________________________________________ Wikimedia-l mailing list Wikimedia-l(a)lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, <mailto:wikimedia-l-request@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe>

Hmmm, the word "wiki" isn't named anywhere. On Wed, Jul 31, 2013 at 9:43 PM, Risker &lt;risker.wp(a)gmail.com&gt; wrote: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-… https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, -- Met vriendelijke groet, Huib Laurens _______________________________________________ Wikimedia-l mailing list Wikimedia-l(a)lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, <mailto:wikimedia-l-request@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe>

I believe the concern derives from one of the subpages of the article: https://image.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/audio/video/2013/7/31/1375… (Credit to David Gerard for digging that out; this same issue is under discussion on the Wikitech-L list.) Risker

On 31 July 2013 20:48, Risker &lt;risker.wp(a)gmail.com&gt; wrote:

> I believe the concern derives from one of the subpages of the article: > https://image.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/audio/video/2013/7/31/1375… > (Credit to David Gerard for digging that out; this same issue is under > discussion on the Wikitech-L list.)

Yes, that's the image that made me say out loud "Fuck. Fuck these people."

Why would we expect that we weren't being targeted? Knowing what people are looking up is powerful knowledge.

Why would we expect that we weren't being targeted? Knowing what people are looking up is powerful knowledge. - Ryan

What surprises me is that anyone is surprised by any of this information.

I think that's just naive. Of course it was always denied until it became impossible to deny it. That's how these things work. But I have honestly assumed for many years that virtually everything transmitted over almost any electronic medium was collected and analyzed in some way. That appears to be the case, and in fact, I expected them to have

On 7/31/2013 3:31 PM, Nathan wrote: Facebook, Google, Yahoo, and Twitter, yes. But mail.ru? The shift from "most" to "all" in the first paragraph may make it easy to assume the similarity is universal, but it's ignoring the full context. That kind of rhetorical shift is a favorite trick of conspiracy theorists, it's how they get you to make those short hops to unwarranted conclusions. --Michael Snow

On Wed, Jul 31, 2013 at 7:11 PM, Michael Snow &lt;wikipedia(a)frontier.com&gt; wrote: they It's hardly a conspiracy theory. Given the differences between mail.ru and Wikipedia, I should think it would be clear why one might be subject to a direct demand for transferring data while the other is not. If anything, I think it's more reasonable to assume that Wikipedia (which shares many features with Google, Yahoo, Twitter, Facebook and other social networks) has been the subject of this kind of demand than that it hasn't. No one with direct knowledge would be able to do anything other than deny it, but we can easily see why data held by Wikipedia (including partially anonymized e-mails, file uploads, talk page communication, etc.) would be of interest to intelligence agencies.

On 07/31/2013 09:27 PM, Ryan Lane wrote: was And very many of us live outside the jurisdiction of the entities that would be doing the monitoring and would be very noisy indeed if something of that nature took place. -- Marc _______________________________________________ Wikimedia-l mailing list Wikimedia-l(a)lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, <mailto:wikimedia-l-request@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe>

On Wed, Jul 31, 2013 at 9:27 PM, Ryan Lane &lt;rlane(a)wikimedia.org&gt; wrote: Key word there being "knowingly".

very helpful, james. thanks so much for clue-ing me in. definitely want to know more of the backstory on the chapters sometime. ttyt :) On Wednesday, July 31, 2013, Tim Starling wrote: -- *Anna Koval* Community Advocate Wikimedia Foundation 415-839-6885 x 6729 akoval(a)wikimedia.org

On 01/08/13 14:15, Anthony wrote: was I don't know why the NSA would sneak around in our data centres mirroring our ethernet ports if they already have almost all of our access logs by capturing unencrypted traffic as it passes through XKeyscore nodes.

anons to HTTPS, that's when they will have an incentive.

And I thought Ryan Lane was talking about the future, not the past. I certainly was.

On Wed, Jul 31, 2013 at 7:11 PM, Michael Snow &lt;wikipedia(a)frontier.com&gt; wrote: It's hardly a conspiracy theory. Given the differences between mail.ru and Wikipedia, I should think it would be clear why one might be subject to a direct demand for transferring data while the other is not. If anything, I think it's more reasonable to assume that Wikipedia (which shares many features with Google, Yahoo, Twitter, Facebook and other social networks) has been the subject of this kind of demand than that it hasn't. No one with direct knowledge would be able to do anything other than deny it, but we can easily see why data held by Wikipedia (including partially anonymized e-mails, file uploads, talk page communication, etc.) would be of interest to intelligence agencies. _______________________________________________ Wikimedia-l mailing list Wikimedia-l(a)lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, <mailto:wikimedia-l-request@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe>

On Wed, Jul 31, 2013 at 4:11 PM, Michael Snow &lt;wikipedia(a)frontier.com&gt;wrote;wrote: Thanks for the voice of reason, Michael. As a quick reminder here, before any conspiracy theories about orders and data retention get out of control: 1) We've flat-out denied any sort of involvement in this, and we continue to stand by that denial: https://blog.wikimedia.org/2013/06/14/prism-surveillance-wikimedia/ 2) Take with a grain of salt, of course, but our understanding (based on the few gag orders that have been made public) is that we could be forced to not confirm having received a National Security Letter, but we can't actually be forced to lie about it. In other words, if we'd received one we would not be allowed to say "we've received one", but we also could not be forced to deny it - we'd always have the option to remain silent instead. 3) We understand that the rules cause some people not to trust our denial, and can't entirely blame them! That is why we've asked the government to change the rules, so that you can have more trust in us next time we issue the same denial: https://blog.wikimedia.org/2013/07/18/wikimedia-foundation-letter-transpare… This is not to say that the http/https issue isn't important; like Engineering, we think progress on that issue is important. But it is important to keep "we don't yet deploy https as widely as we'd like" separate from "there are secret orders to transfer all our logs to the NSA." Thanks- Luis -- Luis Villa Deputy General Counsel Wikimedia Foundation 415.839.6885 ext. 6810 NOTICE: *This message may be confidential or legally privileged. If you have received it by accident, please delete it and let us know about the mistake. As an attorney for the Wikimedia Foundation, for legal/ethical reasons I cannot give legal advice to, or serve as a lawyer for, community members, volunteers, or staff members in their personal capacity.* _______________________________________________ Wikimedia-l mailing list Wikimedia-l(a)lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, <mailto:wikimedia-l-request@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe>

On Wed, Jul 31, 2013 at 5:13 PM, Luis Villa &lt;lvilla(a)wikimedia.org&gt; wrote: <snip> If we are going to chase crazy down the rabbit hole, then it may be worth noticing that the NSL gag order makes it a crime to discuss NSL demands with anyone except A) personal legal counsel, and B) persons who are directly necessary to fulfill the demand. In particular, if I (as an individual) am served with an NSL then there is no provision allowing me to tell my boss or my subordinates unless I directly need their help to satisfy the request. If someone with root access were directly served with an NSL, it isn't obvious that WMF executives would ever learn about it. This is one of the ways that NSL gag orders are ridiculous. -Robert Rohde _______________________________________________ Wikimedia-l mailing list Wikimedia-l(a)lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, <mailto:wikimedia-l-request@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe>

On Wed, Jul 31, 2013 at 5:53 PM, Matthew Walker &lt;mwalker(a)wikimedia.org&gt; wrote: I think that's just naive. Of course it was always denied until it became impossible to deny it. That's how these things work. But I have honestly assumed for many years that virtually everything transmitted over almost any electronic medium was collected and analyzed in some way. That appears to be the case, and in fact, I expected them to have gone further than they have. It seems that most of the data they collect is wiped within 3 days; that the data itself can only be analyzed under a fairly specific set of minimization rules after the approval of a senior executive in the administration, that the rules are drawn from generally accepted 4th amendment jurisprudence, etc. The cynic in me is also convinced that virtually all Western countries do the same sort of thing, if probably on a smaller scale. I would bet all the money I have that at a minimum the French, the English and the Germans maintain roughly similar intelligence gathering programs. But of course, they will deny it until it becomes impossible to deny it. _______________________________________________ Wikimedia-l mailing list Wikimedia-l(a)lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, <mailto:wikimedia-l-request@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe>