Browser vendors could revoke the root that Kazakh authorities are using for
the scheme.
On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 5:35 AM Yuri Astrakhan <yuriastrakhan(a)gmail.com>
wrote:
I don't think browser vendors will block the
ability to install a custom
root certificate because some corp clients may use it for exactly the same
reason -- creating an HTTPS proxy with fake certs in order to analyze
internal traffic (in the name of monitoring/security).
Browser vendors could make it more difficult to install, so that it would
require the corp IT department to do some magic, or even release two
versions of the browser - corp and general (with blocked uncertified root
certs), but at the end of the day those could be worked around.
The biggest deterrent in my opinion is to educating the users of the
dangers such certs would do (i.e. all your passwords and bank info will be
viewable by ISPs) - thus it would be social rather than purely technical
solution.
On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 1:33 PM Steinsplitter Wiki <
steinsplitter(a)wikipedia.de> wrote:
That's shocking...
>> I think this has serious implications for Wikipedia & Wikimedia, as
not
> only
they would be easily able to see which articles people read, but
> also steal login credentials, depseudonymize people and even hijack
> admin accounts.
Yes, they can de-crypt the traffic. Hopefully browser vendors will
disallow the root certificate.
IMHO there isn't much WP can do, expect showing a warning if somebody is
trying to login
from the country in question.
--Steinsplitter
________________________________
Von: Wikimedia-l <wikimedia-l-bounces(a)lists.wikimedia.org> im Auftrag
von
Yury Bulka
<setthemfree(a)privacyrequired.com>
Gesendet: Sonntag, 21. Juli 2019 12:36
An: wikimedia-l(a)lists.wikimedia.org <wikimedia-l(a)lists.wikimedia.org>
Betreff: [Wikimedia-l] Universal forced HTTPS backdoor in Kazakhstan
I'm sure many have heard about this:
https://thehackernews.com/2019/07/kazakhstan-https-security-certificate.html
Essentially, the government in Kazakhstan started forcing citizens into
installing a root TLS certificate on their devices that would allow the
government to intercept, decrypt and manipulate all HTTPS traffic.
Without the centificate, it seems, citizens can't access HTTPS pages (at
least on some ISPs).
I think this has serious implications for Wikipedia & Wikimedia, as not
only they would be easily able to see which articles people read, but
also steal login credentials, depseudonymize people and even hijack
admin accounts.
Another danger is that if this effort by Kazakhstan will succeed, other
governments may start doing the same.
I wonder if WMF has any position on this yet?
Best,
Yury.
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