On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 10:03 AM, Mike Godwin <mnemonic(a)well.com> wrote:
Thomas Dalton writes:
If you are in a
jurisdiction that doesn't recognise moral
rights then (from that POV)
you still have moral rights, the state is just immoral and doesn't
enforce them.
A more nuanced and accurate view of the term "moral rights" is that it
is a term of art relating to copyright and other rights in creative
works.
Maybe you could explain the etymology of that term for us, Mike. Your last
paragraph seems to imply that you understand it.
In any case, how do you propose that we can continue in a way that doesn't
confuse you with sentences like "moral rights are a type of moral rights"?
There is a
fundamental difference between a right
granted by law and a pre-existing right recognised by law.
Is this difference based on anything in the physical world?
Sure, it's based on whether or not the jurisdiction recognizes the right.
That
difference is irrelevant in a courtroom, which is probably why you
dismiss it, but there is a difference.
It's true that religious beliefs don't have great force in Western
courtrooms. I dismiss this particular religious belief not because
it's irrelevant in a courtroom, however, but because there is no
evidence in the physical world that this difference exists.
In what way is the concept of moral rights a religious belief?
Thomas, you may believe that the longstanding debate between natural
law and positivists has been resolved in favor of the
former, but
there's no sign that this is true with regard to copyright.
You could have saved us a lot of time by saying that instead of pretending
you didn't know what I was talking about.
If what
you were saying were widely accepted, it would be odd that "moral
rights" obtain as to copyright/creative expression but not as to
things like property ownership and personal liberty.
That would be odd if it were true. But it isn't. Theft and slavery are
morally wrong, in addition to (and regardless of) being illegal.