"We test two “social conditions” Anonymous vs. Identity disclosure ( anonymous : participants do not know each other; identity : participants were first asked to introduce themselves before experiments and, during the experiments, participants were shown name of their reviewer on the computer screen and vice versa) . In addition to social condition, we introduce “repeated matching” ( 1 round : matching of counterpart and reviewer changes every round; 3 round : each participant will be matched with the same counterpart and the same reviewer for three consecutive rounds) as another dimension to compare the effect of short-term and long-term social pressure. Employing 2 × 2 design, our experiments consist of four treatments, varying in two dimensions.

Parameters used are P =120, k =0.15. NE prediction is e* =10 under correct-reporting (Proposition 1) and e* =1 under over-reporting (Proposition 2). Expected p rofit is π *=45 and π *=59.85, respectively. Experiments were implemented using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). Participants of experiments consist of 108 undergraduate students at a large pu blic research university in the United States. For Anonymous 1 round treatment, we conducted three experimental sessions. Each of the rest three treatments consisted of two sessions. Each session had 12 participants with 15 decision rounds. Subjects received a course credit and cash payment based on their results of the game."

"In Anonymous , correct-reporting is most frequently observed at 42% (1-round) and 59% (3-round). In Identity , over-reporting accounts for more than 64% and 72% , respectively. The findings in reporting behaviors are in line with our expectation as shown on Propositions 1 and 2. That is, when identity is revealed, reviewers feel social pressure to be nice toward players. Therefore, evaluation systems are considered less reliable because it fails to reflect the true efforts.

Another finding is that reporting behavior seems st rengthened for a longer period of matching. Repeate d matching seems to make reviewers form a stronger so cial pressure. For example, higher proportion of over-reporting in Identity 3 round suggests an increased social pressure due to expec tation of a long-term relationship between reviewers and players. “

"Median efforts from four treatments are all lower than that of standard economics prediction (assuming objective-r eporting, e* =10). This suggests that players suspect reliability of evaluation systems. For Anonymous 1 round and 3 round where correct-reporting is observed at a high rate, the median efforts are both 8. This high median efforts imply that players in anonymous settings generally hold a stronger belief that evaluation systems are still reliable at some extent.

Surprisingly, for Identity 1 round where scores are mostly inflated, the median effort is still 8. The average effort is at 8.2, even higher than both Anonymous treatments (7.3 and 7.6). This finding suggests a gap between players’ belief and reviewers’ behavior. While reviewers feel strong social pressure by revealing identity, players doubt that social pressure of reviewers will be enough to be nice. However , such doubt disappears when players recognize a long-term relationship. For Identity 3 round , the median and average efforts decrease into 5 and 5.6, respectively, the lowest level among all treatments."

Kevin Crowston | Distinguished Professor of Information Science | School of Information Studies

Syracuse University

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Syracuse, New York 13244

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crowston.syr.edu