Hi David,
Thanks for explaining this. I sometimes struggle to filter out the
activist noise in EFF articles.
As you seem quite knowledgeable with the national situation and the
activities of other groups on digital rights, do you have actions in mind
that would make sense for us? And how can we, as a global community, help
you?
In Europe we'd basically analyse the law, draft amendments (if it is
"fixable") and reach out to policy makers, other stakeholders plus the
media. But not sure what actions could make sense in Indonesia.
Cheers,
Dimi
На пт, 19.03.2021 г. в 12:06 ч. DW Fisher-Freberg <
dwfisherfreberg(a)gmail.com> написа:
Hi Dimitar,
Thank you for your reply. Ministerial Regulation No. 5/2020 repealed two
existing regulations:
- The Ministerial Regulation on "Supervision of Internet Sites with
Negative Contents" (No. 19/2014)
<https://jdih.kominfo.go.id/produk_hukum/view/id/215/t/peraturan+menteri+komunikasi+dan+informatika+nomor+19+tahun+2014+tanggal+17+juli+2014>:
primarily oriented towards sites containing contents of child pornography,
incitement of violence, and two vaguely-worded standings: "ethnicity,
religion, race, and other groups" and "other illegal activities based
on the provisions of laws and regulations". It allowed ISPs to block
contents on those two sites under two-mechanisms: self-block or using
third-party "blocking services".
- The Ministerial Regulation on "Electronic System Operator
Registration Procedures" (No. 36/2014)
<https://jdih.kominfo.go.id/produk_hukum/view/id/235/t/peraturan+menteri+komunikasi+dan+informatika+nomor+36+tahun+2014+tanggal+30+september+2014>:
specified what kind of Internet provider that has to register with the
government. Under this one, it was *mandatory* to register for
"providers of Internet services for public necessities" (which covered
government agencies, state-owned corporations, and courts), but it was
*optional* for those *not* providing Internet services for public
necessities, which are the commercial, non-profit, and/or UGC Internet
enterprises. There was no specified mechanism for IP unmasking or any other
form of online identity unmasking in this regulation. Therefore, Wikimedia
project sites were never subject to any kind of registration to the
government under this regulation
MR No. 5/2020 expanded the mandatory registration for *all* providers of
Internet services and enterprises (public or private, providing services
for public necessities or not, registered in Indonesia or in abroad, UGC or
not) with the government, and introduced a whole new set of mechanism that
would inevitably force them to share the online identity of their users
upon request of the government, law enforcement agencies, and/or the court *without
*having to establish any form of reasonable suspicion. No court order is
needed for the request to be executed, nor any form of appeal are provided
to challenge the legality of such request. There is no reason why the
government includes UGC sites, either. Reasons to request an unmasking of
users identity including terrorism, child pornography, gambling, and two
vaguely-worded reasons: "content which is prohibited under its
authority" and "content that disrupts public order".
There is *no* explicit threat of criminal or civil punishment if a PSE
under MR 5/2020 refuses to register; but refusal to cooperate with the
government, law enforcement agencies, and/or the court upon a request of
user identity unmasking may subject to written warning, temporary or
permanent block of access to the site, de-registration of the PSE, and up 2
to 5 years of imprisonment.
I could imagine a request to unmask the identity of a registered user at
a Wikimedia project which had contributed or edited an article that was
viewed as contrary to the government's official narrative of an event or
subject to increasing public controversy. Such requests would inevitably go
to the CheckUser, which is subject to the said penalties if they refuse to
cooperate. That being said, the Indonesian affiliate of Wikimedia and
sysops of Indonesia's Wikimedia projects are the ones with the greatest
exposure to criminal charges under this regulation; adding more burden to
their already vulnerable positions due to an incident that happened as
recently as June 2020, when users and sysops of Indonesian Wikipedia are doxxed
and cyber attacked
<https://wikimedia.or.id/pers/wikipedia-dan-topik-kontroversial-netralitas-dalam-urun-daya-pengetahuan-di-wikipedia/>
for historical articles that do not present the government-friendly
narrative
<https://inet.detik.com/cyberlife/d-5039752/ramai-ramai-boikotwikipedia-gara-gara-artikel-pki>
[id].
On the question of what event triggered MR No. 5/2020: a combination of political
and security situation
<https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/06/03/internet-ban-during-antiracism-unrest-in-papua-deemed-illegal.html>,
social situation
<https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/10/26/growing-fear-of-speaking-out-survey-finds-indonesias-civil-liberties-under-threat.html>,
and other issues
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/17/indonesia-s-shrinking-civic-space-for-protests-and-digital-activism-pub-83250>;
as well the increasingly illiberal and anti-open Internet digital
policies
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00074918.2020.1846482>
[pdf] of the current administration. For better understanding, please find
SAFEnet's full report on the state of digital rights in Indonesia here
<https://safenet.or.id/2020/10/digital-rights-situation-report-indonesia-2019-the-rise-of-digital-authoritarian/>
.
*David W. Fisher-Freberg*
meta <https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:David_Wadie_Fisher-Freberg>
id.wp <https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pengguna:David_Wadie_Fisher-Freberg>
min.wp
<https://min.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pangguno:David_Wadie_Fisher-Freberg>
commons
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:David_Wadie_Fisher-Freberg>
On Fri, Mar 19, 2021 at 12:51 PM Dimitar Parvanov Dimitrov <
dimitar.parvanov.dimitrov(a)gmail.com> wrote:
Hi David,
Thank you for reaching out to the list and I hope we can help. I
definitely think we should put our heads together on this!
One thing that I am struggling to understand is the following: "unmask
IP addresses of websites that are user-generated". What is the current
system? Who and under which circumstances can unmask IP addresses right
now? Why would it in this case only target user-generated sites and not all
sites hosting (allegedly) illegal activities?
Generally there are two strategies: Either you try to stop the entire
law/paragraph or to get an exception for what you care. Stopping a
paragraph could also mean replacing it with something else.
Has there been some concrete event that triggered the Ministry to move
in this direction?
Thank you again and sorry for asking more questions right now than I
have answers for you!
Cheers,
Dimi
На сб, 13.03.2021 г. в 4:52 ч. DW Fisher-Freberg <
dwfisherfreberg(a)gmail.com> написа:
Hello everyone,
In November 2020, Indonesian Ministry of ICT passed a new regulation (Permenkominfo
5/2020
<https://jdih.kominfo.go.id/produk_hukum/view/id/759/t/peraturan+menteri+komunikasi+dan+informatika+nomor+5+tahun+2020>)
on "Private Electronic System''. Among others, the regulation would allow
the government to force ISPs and basically any web operator to unmask IP
addresses of websites that are user-generated for a very broad set of
reasons, including but not limited to "inflammatory contents" and "public
disorder". The Electronic Frontier Foundation has discussed this new
regulation at length here
<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/02/indonesias-proposed-online-intermediary-regulation-may-be-most-repressive-yet>
.
At Indonesian Wikipedia village pump
<https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Warung_Kopi_(Kebijakan)#Permenkominfo_No._5/2020>,
we concluded that this regulation will invariably make Wikimedia projects
and affiliates in Indonesia subject to it. We are very concerned about the
possibility of a broad interpretation of this regulation by the government
and its effect on Wikimedia projects here, especially observing the increasingly
illiberal attitude
<https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/11/07/from-buzzers-to-prosecutions-indonesias-internet-freedom-under-threat.html>
of the current government on Internet and data policy.
We would very much welcome suggestions, warning tales, and/or practical
experiences that we could learn in anticipating this regulation's incoming
enforcement.
Best,
*David W. Fisher-Freberg*
meta <https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:David_Wadie_Fisher-Freberg>
id.wp
<https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pengguna:David_Wadie_Fisher-Freberg>
min.wp
<https://min.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pangguno:David_Wadie_Fisher-Freberg>
commons
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:David_Wadie_Fisher-Freberg>
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