[WikiEN-l] Wikipedia:Paradoxes
WJhonson at aol.com
WJhonson at aol.com
Sun Aug 2 02:59:57 UTC 2009
I know you are trying to be rigorous, but your logic has far too many
assumptions to be so.
Firstly you assume that a property is eternal. Predicate logic would
probably assume that if A exists, than that does not change, but the entire
message I'm proposing is that this property can change. That is, God can
create a stone and then make it uncrushable. Does God turning a stone from
crushable into uncrushable imply that God has done something which God cannot
do? I submit that no it does not because God can simply change that
property back to crushable once more, and then crush the stone.
You are assuming that God is singular, but nothing in your logic requires
that.
You are also assuming that God is omnipotent.
So that's at least three pre-requisites that you did not state clearly.
If you want to be rigorous perhaps you should start from a more basic set of
axioms.
Will
In a message dated 8/1/2009 7:45:12 A.M. Pacific Daylight Time,
brewhaha at freenet.edmonton.ab.ca writes:
Please allow me to start this proof from scratch and try to go from the
paradox that is most interesting to the simple answer of no, and
generalizing it to all paradoxes, refuting objections in a monologue,
because it does not seem to contain equally powerful participants. Can God
crush an uncrushable stone? In mechanically verifiable predicate logic
notation, I can write "exists(God) implies not exists(UnCrushableStone)".
Spelled out in plain English, that means God can do any thing, and that is
singular, because if God can do any combination of things, then he can
contradict himself and crush the stone, which does not allow for a
self-consistent proof, because that allows God to prove that the
uncrushable
stone did not exist in the first place. exists(UnCrushableStone) implies
not
exists(God). Translation: If the uncrushable stone exists, then God does
not, because the stone's existence implies something God cannot do and God
can do any thing. Either God exists or the UnCrushableStone exists (and
not
both). exists(God) xor exists(UnCrushableStone). For God to crush the
uncrushable stone requires both God and the uncrushable stone to be
present
at the same time. not(exists(God) and exists(UnCrushableStone)). Their
existence is mutually exclusive. In any true paradox that demands a
contest
between two beings with an ultimate power, and where those two beings
exclude each other, the answer is no, because those two beings cannot
exist
at once. So, what happens if God creates the uncrushable stone? He cannot
do
that without changing himself in the same move. In creating the
uncrushable
stone, he creates something that is not possible, so God would no longer
be
omnipotent. If God is no longer omnipotent, then no God is.
_______
"Another round, Mr. Descartes?" "I think not," said Descartes, who
promptly
vanished.
"Can you think?", I asked, putting Descartes before the horse.
We are Descartes of Borg: We assimilate, therefore we are.
_______________________________________________
WikiEN-l mailing list
WikiEN-l at lists.wikimedia.org
To unsubscribe from this mailing list, visit:
https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikien-l
**************A Good Credit Score is 700 or Above. See yours in just 2 easy
steps!
(http://pr.atwola.com/promoclk/100126575x1222846709x1201493018/aol?redir=http://www.freecreditreport.com/pm/default.aspx?sc=668072&hmpgID=115&bcd
=JulystepsfooterNO115)
More information about the WikiEN-l
mailing list