Hi Spencer,
thanks for this, quick reactions in your emai textl. The text still is
not final in the sense that the trilogues may change it, so don't take
it as a definite answer.
On 08.04.19 18:01, Spencer Graves wrote:
Hi, Anna:
Thanks for this.
How does this affect the financial incentives for commercial
social media companies to sell xenophobic ads with no public
traceability?
It doesn't. See this thread for more background on the
objectives of the
regulation
https://twitter.com/a2na/status/1115231329849884672
How does this legislation compare with the USA Patriot Act,
which has been used to imprison people who tried to teach nonviolence
to terrorist or people raising money for hospitals on Palestine?
I don't know
the Patriot Act in detail so it would need a more thorough
comparison, but potentially such thing could happen on the grounds of
the anti-terrorist /directive/ that is separate act on combating
terrorism (so not only content, as this one is) - depending on whether
this would be considered contributing to terrorist offences or not.
Could this legislation be used to make it difficult for people
to question the wisdom of supporting the current government of Saudi
Arabia, e.g., with transfers of arms and nuclear technology?
Probably not, I think
this would be a big stretch of the law even in its
worst form, as we saw by EC. But looking at the imaginative policies of
Orban for example I tend not to underestimate dictator's drive to have
things their way, so depending on what they consider as dissent, public
threat, etc. The trouble is, that once removal orders are issues, the
platforms must remove content and they do not have the option to contest
them on the grounds of being absurd.
I ask for several reasons: (a) Terrorism is miniscule as a
cause of death. More Americans drown in the average year in bathtubs,
hot tubs and spas than succumb to terrorism; similar silliness
doubtless also applies to Europe. (b) A 2008 RAND study showed that
only 7% of terrorist groups that ended between 1968 and 2006 were
defeated militarily. 83% ended with negotiations or law enforcement.
(c) The primary recruiter and supporter for Islamic terrorism since at
least 1999 and continuing today appears to be Saudi Arabia, followed
closely by the US. For detailed references, see the Wikiversity
article on "Winning the War on Terror".[1]
I agree, I wish they tackled
global warming with such fierce attitude.
Would this legislation force the Wikimedia Foundation to take
down what I've already written in that article?[1] I assume the
answer to that question is, "no". However, it seems like it could
potentially make it more difficult for people to understand "Why do
they hate us" (as US President Bush asked on 2001-09-20.
The legislation does not apply many direct measures to platforms, other
than duty of care (which of course is something already). If platforms
know about criminal terrorist content they need to inform authorities
(LIBE version), they also need to adjust their ToC and may use
automation for flagging but may not actively seek terrorist content. Any
measures forced on them cannot amount to general monitoring. But if a
formally correct removal order comes to remove this article, then we'll
have to comply.
I wouldn't be too worried about us in terms of normal activity and
relationships with EU states. If a malicious government would like to
use this against us, things may get worse, however.
Thanks,
Spencer Graves, PhD
Founder
EffectiveDefense.org
4550 Warwick Blvd 508
Kansas City, MO 64111 USA
[1]
https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Winning_the_War_on_Terror
On 2019-04-08 10:28, Anna Mazgal wrote:
Dear All,
Civil Liberties committee has just adopted MEP Dalton's compromises
as the report on the Regulation on preventing the dissemination of
terrorist content online. There are some amendments added that
require further analysis but the key changes are positive:
1. Improvements on definition of terrorist content with exclusions to
artistic, journalistic, educational and research purposes
2. Specific measures referring to platforms receiving a substantial
number of removal orders; the regulation applies to those that make
content available to the public (so a positive limitation)
3. Referrals removed from the proposal with a caveat that Europol
referrals should be taken as a priority by platforms when content is
flagged (in recital)
4. Specific measures steer away from content filtering and forbid
general monitoring.
Unfortunately, the 1h deadline for removing content has been
sustained. Interestingly, Rapporteur Dalton called out the European
Commission on not understanding the democratic parliamentary process,
applying pressure on quick adoption of the file and dismissing debate
on controversial issues as unnecessary and going against the goals of
the regulation. It is quite a serious accusation as the EC is not
supposed to pressure MEPs that way.
After the text is published we will have a more in-depth analysis of
other changes and how the whole proposal could affect Wikimedia. The
vote in the plenary is planned for next week. After that - the trilogues.
Happy to take on any questions you may have regarding the report.
best wishes,
Anna
--
Anna Mazgal
EU Policy Advisor
Wikimedia
anna(a)wikimedia.be <mailto:anna@wikimedia.be>
@a2na
mobile: +32 487 222 945
51 Rue du Trône
BE-1050 Brussels
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Anna Mazgal
EU Policy Advisor
Wikimedia
anna(a)wikimedia.be
@a2na
mobile: +32 487 222 945
51 Rue du Trône
BE-1050 Brussels